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INFORMATION |
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| Agreement
on Agriculture ( Articles) Special and
Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in the Agreement on
Agriculture |
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W.T.O. Framework Agreement on
Agriculture - Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture.
The
starting point for the current phase of the agriculture negotiations has
been the mandate set out in Paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration. This in turn built on the long-term objective of the Agreement
on Agriculture to establish a fair and market-oriented trading system
through a programme of fundamental reform. The elements below offer the
additional precision required at this stage of the negotiations and thus the
basis for the negotiations of full modalities in the next phase. The level
of ambition set by the
The
final balance will be found only at the conclusion of these subsequent
negotiations and within the Single Undertaking. To achieve this balance, the
modalities to be developed will need to incorporate operationally effective
and meaningful provisions for special and differential treatment for
developing country Members. Agriculture is of critical importance to the
economic development of developing country Members and they must be able to
pursue agricultural policies that are supportive of their development goals,
poverty reduction strategies, food security and livelihood concerns.
Non-trade concerns, as referred to in Paragraph 13 of the Doha Declaration,
will be taken into account.
The
reforms in all three pillars form an interconnected whole and must be
approached in a balanced and equitable manner.
The
General Council recognizes the importance of cotton for a certain number of
countries and its vital importance for developing countries, especially LDCs.
It will be addressed ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically,
within the agriculture negotiations. The
provisions of this framework provide a basis for this approach, as does the
sectoral initiative on cotton. The
Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture shall ensure appropriate
prioritization of the cotton issue independently from other sectoral
initiatives. A subcommittee on
cotton will meet periodically and report to the Special Session of the
Committee on Agriculture to review progress.
Work shall encompass all trade-distorting policies affecting the
sector in all three pillars of market access, domestic support, and export
competition, as specified in the
Coherence
between trade and development aspects of the cotton issue will be pursued as
set out in paragraph 1.b of the text to which this Framework is annexed.
The
Doha Ministerial Declaration calls for "substantial reductions in
trade-distorting domestic support". With a view to achieving these
substantial reductions, the negotiations in this pillar will ensure the
following:
Special
and differential treatment remains an integral component of domestic
support. Modalities to be developed will include longer implementation
periods and lower reduction coefficients for all types of trade-distorting
domestic support and continued access to the provisions under Article 6.2.
There
will be a strong element of harmonisation in the reductions made by
developed Members. Specifically, higher levels of permitted trade-distorting
domestic support will be subject to deeper cuts.
Each
such Member will make a substantial reduction in the overall level of its
trade-distorting support from bound
levels.
As
well as this overall commitment, Final Bound Total AMS and permitted de minimis levels will be subject to
substantial reductions and, in the case of the Blue Box, will
be capped as specified in paragraph 15 in order to ensure results
that are coherent with the long-term reform objective. Any clarification or
development of rules and conditions to govern trade distorting support will
take this into account.
Overall
Reduction: A Tiered Formula
The
overall base level of all trade-distorting domestic support, as
measured by the Final Bound Total AMS plus permitted de minimis level and the level agreed in paragraph 8 below for Blue Box payments, will
be reduced according to a tiered formula. Under this formula, Members having
higher levels of trade-distorting domestic support will make greater overall
reductions in order to achieve a harmonizing result.
As the first instalment of the
overall cut, in the first year and throughout the implementation period, the
sum of all trade-distorting support will not exceed 80 per cent of the sum
of Final Bound Total AMS plus permitted de
minimis plus the Blue Box at the level determined in paragraph 15.
The
following parameters will guide the further negotiation of this tiered
formula:
This
commitment will apply as a minimum overall commitment. It will not be
applied as a ceiling on reductions of overall trade-distorting domestic
support, should the separate and complementary formulae to be developed for
Total AMS, de minimis and Blue Box
payments imply, when taken together, a deeper cut in overall
trade-distorting domestic support for an individual Member.
The
base for measuring the Blue Box component will be the higher of existing
Blue Box payments during a recent representative period to be agreed and the
cap established in paragraph 15 below.
Final Bound
Total AMS: A Tiered Formula
To
achieve reductions with a harmonizing effect:
Members
may make greater than formula reductions in order to achieve the required
level of cut in overall trade-distorting domestic support.
De Minimis
Reductions
in de minimis will be negotiated taking into account the principle of
special and differential treatment. Developing
countries that allocate almost all de minimis programmes for subsistence and resource-poor farmers will
be exempt.
12.
Members may make greater than formula reductions in order to achieve the
required level of cut in overall trade-distorting domestic support.
Blue Box
13.
Members recognize the role of the Blue Box in promoting
agricultural reforms. In this light, Article 6.5 will be reviewed so that Members may have recourse to the following
measures:
-
such payments are based on
fixed and unchanging areas and yields; or
-
such payments are made on
85% or less of a fixed and unchanging base level of production; or
-
livestock payments are
made on a fixed and unchanging number of head.
Or
-
such payments are based on
fixed and unchanging bases and yields; or
-
livestock payments made on a fixed and unchanging
number of head; and
-
such payments are made on
85% or less of a fixed and unchanging base level of production.
14. The above
criteria, along with additional criteria will be negotiated. Any such criteria
will ensure that Blue Box payments are
less trade-distorting than AMS measures, it being understood that:
Any
new criteria would need to take account of the balance of WTO rights and
obligations.
Any new criteria to be agreed will not have the perverse effect of undoing ongoing reforms.
15.
Blue Box support will not exceed 5% of a
Member’s average total value of agricultural production during an
historical period. The historical period will be established in the
negotiations. This ceiling will
apply to any actual or potential Blue Box user from the beginning of the
implementation period. In
cases where a Member has placed an exceptionally large percentage of its
trade-distorting support in the Blue Box, some flexibility will be provided on a
basis to be agreed to ensure that such a Member is not called upon to make a
wholly disproportionate cut.
Green Box
16.
Green Box criteria will be reviewed and clarified
with a view to ensuring that Green Box measures have no, or at most
minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production. Such a review and clarification will need to ensure that the basic concepts,
principles and effectiveness of the Green Box remain and take due account of
non-trade concerns. The improved obligations for monitoring and surveillance of
all new disciplines foreshadowed in paragraph 48 below will be particularly
important with respect to the Green Box.
17.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration calls for "reduction of, with a
view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies".
As an outcome of the negotiations, Members agree to establish detailed
modalities ensuring the parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies
and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect by a credible end
date.
End Point
18.
The following will be eliminated by the end date to be agreed:
Export
subsidies as scheduled.
Export
credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes with repayment
periods beyond 180 days.
Terms and conditions relating to export credits,
export credit guarantees or insurance programmes with repayment periods of
180 days and below which are not in
accordance with disciplines to be agreed. These disciplines will cover, inter
alia, payment of interest, minimum interest rates, minimum premium
requirements, and other elements which can constitute subsidies or otherwise
distort trade.
Trade
distorting practices with respect to exporting STEs including eliminating
export subsidies provided to or by them, government financing, and the
underwriting of losses. The issue of the future use of monopoly powers will
be subject to further negotiation.
Provision
of food aid that is not in conformity with operationally effective
disciplines to be agreed. The objective of such disciplines will be to
prevent commercial displacement. The
role of international organizations as regards the provision of food aid by
Members, including related humanitarian and developmental issues, will be
addressed in the negotiations. The
question of providing food aid exclusively in fully grant form will also be
addressed in the negotiations.
19.Effective
transparency provisions for paragraph 18 will be established. Such provisions,
in accordance with standard WTO practice, will be consistent with commercial
confidentiality considerations.
Implementation
20.
Commitments and
disciplines in paragraph 18 will be implemented according to a schedule and
modalities to be agreed. Commitments will be implemented by annual instalments.
Their phasing will take into account the need for some coherence with internal
reform steps of Members.
21.The
negotiation of the elements in paragraph 18 and their implementation will ensure
equivalent and parallel commitments by Members.
22.Developing
country Members will benefit from longer implementation periods for the phasing
out of all forms of export subsidies.
23.
Developing countries will continue to benefit from special and
differential treatment under the provisions of Article 9.4 of the Agreement on
Agriculture for a reasonable period, to be negotiated, after the phasing out of
all forms of export subsidies and implementation of all disciplines identified
above are completed.
24.
Members will ensure that the disciplines on export credits,
export credit guarantees or insurance programs to be agreed will make
appropriate provision for differential treatment in favour of least-developed
and net food-importing developing countries as provided for in paragraph 4 of
the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform
Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries.
Improved obligations for monitoring and surveillance of all new
disciplines as foreshadowed in paragraph 48 will be critically important in this
regard. Provisions
to be agreed in this respect must not undermine the commitments undertaken by
Members under the obligations in paragraph 18 above.
25.
STEs in developing country Members which
enjoy special privileges to preserve domestic consumer price stability and to
ensure food security will receive special consideration for maintaining monopoly
status.
Special
Circumstances
26.
In exceptional circumstances, which
cannot be adequately covered by food aid, commercial export credits or
preferential international financing facilities, ad hoc temporary
financing arrangements relating to
exports to developing countries may be agreed by Members.
Such agreements must not have the effect of undermining
commitments undertaken by Members in
paragraph 18 above, and will be based on criteria and consultation
procedures to be established.
27.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration calls for "substantial improvements
in market access". Members also agreed that special and differential
treatment for developing Members would be an integral part of all elements in
the negotiations.
The Single Approach: a Tiered Formula
28.
To ensure that a single approach for developed and developing country
Members meets all the objectives of the Doha mandate, tariff reductions will be
made through a tiered formula that takes into account their different tariff
structures.
29.
To ensure that such a formula will lead to substantial trade expansion,
the following principles will guide its further negotiation:
Tariff
reductions will be made from bound rates. Substantial overall tariff
reductions will be achieved as a final result from negotiations.
Each
Member (other than LDCs) will make a contribution. Operationally effective
special and differential provisions for developing country Members will be
an integral part of all elements.
Progressivity
in tariff reductions will be achieved through deeper cuts in higher tariffs
with flexibilities for sensitive products. Substantial improvements in
market access will be achieved for all products.
Sensitive
Products
Selection
31.
Without undermining the overall objective of the tiered approach, Members may
designate an appropriate number, to be negotiated, of tariff lines to be treated
as sensitive, taking account of existing commitments for these products.
Treatment
32.The
principle of ‘substantial improvement’ will apply to each product.
33.
‘Substantial improvement’ will be achieved through combinations of
tariff quota commitments and tariff reductions applying to each product.
However, balance in this negotiation will be found only if the final
negotiated result also reflects the sensitivity of the product concerned.
34.
The extent of MFN-based tariff quota expansion and any required tariff
reduction for all such products will be determined in the negotiations.
A base for tariff quota expansion will be established, taking account of
coherent and equitable criteria to be developed in the negotiations.
In order not to undermine the objective of the tiered approach for all
such products, MFN-based tariff quota expansion will be provided under specific
rules to be negotiated taking into account deviations from the tariff formula.
Other Elements
35.
Other elements that will give the flexibility required to reach a final
balanced result include reduction or elimination of in-quota tariff rates,
and operationally effective improvements in tariff quota administration for
existing tariff quotas so as to enable Members, and particularly developing
country Members, to fully benefit from the market access opportunities under
tariff rate quotas.
36.
Tariff escalation will be addressed through a formula to be agreed.
37.
The issue of tariff simplification remains under negotiation.
38.
The question of the special agricultural safeguard (SSG) remains under
negotiation.
Special and
differential treatment
39.
Having regard to their rural development, food security and/or livelihood
security needs, special and differential treatment for developing countries will
be an integral part of all elements of the negotiation,
including the tariff reduction formula, the number and treatment of sensitive
products, expansion of tariff rate quotas, and implementation period.
40.
Proportionality will be achieved by requiring lesser tariff reduction
commitments or tariff quota expansion commitments from developing country
Members.
41.
Developing country Members will have the flexibility to designate an
appropriate number of products as Special Products, based on criteria of food
security, livelihood security and rural development needs.
These products will be
eligible for more flexible treatment. The
criteria and treatment of these products will be further specified during the
negotiation phase and will recognize the fundamental importance of Special
Products to developing countries.
42.
A Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) will be established for use by
developing country Members.
44.
The importance of long-standing preferences is fully recognised. The
issue of preference erosion will be addressed. For the further consideration in
this regard, paragraph 16 and other relevant provisions of TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1 will
be used as a reference.
LEAST-
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
45.Least-Developed
Countries, which will have full access to all special and differential treatment
provisions above, are not required to undertake reduction commitments.
Developed Members, and developing
country Members in a position to do so, should provide duty-free and quota-free
market access for products originating from least-developed countries.
46.Work
on cotton under all the pillars will reflect the vital importance of this sector
to certain LDC Members and we will work to achieve ambitious results
expeditiously.
RECENTLY
ACCEDED MEMBERS
47.The
particular concerns of recently acceded Members will be effectively addressed
through specific flexibility provisions.
MONITORING
AND SURVEILLANCE
48.
Article 18 of the Agreement on Agriculture will be amended with a view to
enhancing monitoring so as to effectively ensure full transparency, including
through timely and complete notifications with respect to the commitments in
market access, domestic support and export competition. The particular concerns
of developing countries in this regard will be addressed.
OTHER
ISSUES
49.
Issues of interest but not agreed: sectoral
initiatives, differential export taxes, GIs.
50. Disciplines on export prohibitions and restrictions in Article 12.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture will be strengthened.
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